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ABSTRACT
Are low-income economies destined to remain outstripped by the
developed world in all aspects pertaining to standards of
living? As things stand now in terms of development, several low
income countries would seem constrained by their strategic
stance. To achieve any measure of improvement in these
circumstances, these countries must engage in international
market transactions.
Entering the international market arena will, however, require
overcoming a number of barriers. This paper identifies these
barriers at three distinct and yet interrelated levels. These
include structural barriers within the country, competitive
barriers which require attention to relations management based on
interdependencies, and market access barriers suggesting how to
create demand pull situations through satisfying customer needs.
Three strategic areas represented by the STRATEGY PYRAMID are
highlighted in this paper to overcome the barriers. These
include product-market strategies, technology industry
strategies, and structural strategies. The subcomponents of each
of these strategies represent parameters which the target
countries need to blend. This will help them in formulating
appropriate plans to facilitate international market transactions
for improving their socio-economic conditions.
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in 2011 with funding from
University of Illinois Urbana-Champaign
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I. INTRODUCTION
Despite the increasing rhetoric on global poverty alleviation,
the world remains polarized between what has been characterized
as developed and developing, North and South, haves and
have-nots, rich and poor, or centre and periphery. Clearly, there
are gaps in patterns of growth, investments, consumption, life
styles, and related aspects between the two. This leads to
several questions. Can the developing countries ever bridge this
gap? What forces do they have to contend with? What are the
hurdles they have to overcome? Are there any lessons of
experience that they can emulate? From a strategic planning
perspective, what strategic choices do they have in addressing
and overcoming their present development dilemma?
The problem of economic growth has been viewed from a number of
perspectives such as the Marxian approach with its dialectical
inevitability of the socialist revolution, the stage theories
emphasizing a particular pattern of growth common to all
economies ( Rostow's five stages from traditional society to the
age of high mass consumption) , balanced growth theories dictating
a need for balanced and large scale effort to get an economy
moving
, entrepreneurship as an essential ingredient of economic
progress capital oriented approaches in which capital has been
attributed a dominant role in the process of development, and the
basic needs approach. If nothing else, these competing theories
point out that development is an issue that is very complex and
will seemingly require multifaceted approaches to achieve any
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success, no matter how small.
The focus of this paper is on international market transactions.
While market transactions are implicit in all the theories
mentioned above, it is our strong belief that by making them
explicit, an important component of development may be dealt with
more accurately . This choice is predicated on several
assumptions (Smith and Toye, 1979; Keesing, 1979).
First, improved international transactions can promote large
scale production for those products on which the developing
countries have a comparative advantage and relatively small
domestic markets. Second, by raising incomes, domestic trade
should expand demand, creating opportunities for learning, scale
economies, and a more diversified productive base. Third, it
could create and demonstrate the existence of markets - initially
caterd by imports - that can eventually be substituted by local
enterprise. Fourth, it could bring with it new products, new
technology, new standards, and new ideas, as well as assistance
in mastering them. Finally, international transactions can serve
as a source of stimulus and pressure from international
competition which can force focus countries to adapt to these
pressures by actually mastering the techniques and meeting the
standards of foreign competitors.
What motivates this paper is a search for strategies that could
be adopted by about 34 countries (referred to as focus countries
in this paper) designated by the World Bank as low income
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economies who hardly seem important in international market
transactions. Their foreign debts are high and their balance of
payments (particularly the gap between imports and exports)
position is precariously adverse and growing. This, coupled with
many other problems, has created a situation in which the economy
of many developing countries are more dependent on the
developments and expansions in other economies. In other words,
they are not in charge of their own destinies. Consequently,
there has been some discussion that the focus of the problem is
not located in the developing country but outside it (Amin, 1976;
1977)
.
Given the potential importance of international transactions in
improving the overall economic conditions of countries engaging
in it, we attempt to stress that these 34 low income countries
need to develop strategies from a competitive marketing stance
rather than seek the concessionary approaches advocated by such
organizations like UNCTAD. This belief follows from the
increasing evidence that efforts of UNCTAD to gain concessions
for the developing countries through ideas such as the most
favoured nation (MFN) principle, the international commodity
agreements (ICA) the generalized system of preferences (GSP), the
multilateral trade negotiations (MTN) , and the like have not
produced any significant gains.
Since all countries, whether developed or developing, will act
only in their own best interest, we believe that developing
countries should not expect continuing favours or concessions in
-4-
terms of market access, technology, or higher amounts of aid from
the developed countries, particularly in an era of cut-throat
competition and a low growth world scenario (World Bank, 1983).
The literature on economic aid, for example, would support the
contention that aid dependence must be reduced. In this regard,
Henriot (1981) indicates that overall aid declined from .52
percent of GNP in 1960 to .34 percent in 1970 and continued
slipping to .29 percent in 1975. Clearly, reliance on aid may
have crippling consequences for the focus countries if they do
not develop alternate means of sustenance.
The idea of forging together strong regional or global coalitions
(as stressed by the proponents of the New International Economic
Order) which through their interventions and backed by greater
bargaining power could demolish the existing structure of global
domination also seems unworkable (a notable example being the
arduous negotiating process and frequent disagreements within
OPEC). As the Economist (1986) notes, attempts at rigging price
or production of commodities such as oil, tin, coffee, rubber,
etc. are discouraging after ten years' lobbying by the UNCTAD. It
also points to the dismal history of the international cocoa
agreements in which pacts to maintain stable prices foundered
with economic changes in the international markets.
Under the circumstances, it is not unreasonable to argue that the
developing countries will have to go it alone and mount
individual strategies to survive in a complex and conflict ridden
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environment . In stressing this go it alone perspective, this
paper highlights three strategic factors that the focus countries
must continuously analyse to remain effective in their efforts to
improve international market transactions to achieve their
development goals. These include MARKET ACCESS FACTORS,
COMPETITIVE FACTORS, AND STRUCTURAL FACTORS.
The crux of the position we are presenting is that markets should
not be viewed as mere institutions independent of dynamic
determinants of demand and supply. Rather, we strongly feel that
markets must be viewed as highly complex, dynamic, and with the
power to exert powerful discipline and rewards. In addition, we
feel that the proper understanding of markets is from the view of
buyer/consumer, not the focus countrys' need to export. The
factors that represent this orientation and the consequent need
to understand them are briefly discussed below.
MARKET ACCESS FACTORS should be carefully analysed because it is
argued and emphatically stressed here that it is not concessions
and privileges that win customer favour. What gains favour is
customer satisfaction that must be continuously offered and
reinforced by the focus countries to build and retain customer
loyalty in favour of their products.
COMPETITIVE FACTORS deserve careful attention because, as argued
earlier, all nations are expected to act in their own best
interests and maximize their competitive strength to achieve
market control. In fact much of the current discussion on trade
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is cast in the language of war or zero-sum games (Kotler and
Singh, 1983). Under the circumstances, the developing countries
must be able to take the best attack-defense posture to create,
maintain, and extend their grip on their chosen markets.
STRUCTURAL FACTORS are also addressed because of their critical
role in representing the extent of resilience, flexibility, and
maneuverability that the developing countries can command in
battling the complex market forces in the international
environment. Without attention to these factors they could
become vulnerable to attack from rivals, new entrants, or even
substitutes and lose whatever competitive advantage they may
have. Alternatively, they could be left behind if they are
incapable of adapting to the changing needs and wants of markets
in which potential customers are becoming ever more sophisticated
and demanding.
The ENVIRONMENT as a factor should also be considered in
analysing the complexities of international market transactions.
But it is an uncontrollable element and hence cannot be
considered as strategic. However it can determine to a
significant extent whether and to what extent adaptation can be
achieved in the international scene.
This paper assumes that focus country means some sort of
government-industry collaboration which would seem essential as
demonstrated by Japan's industry-MITI collaboration (Lazer,
Murata, and Kosaka, 1985) or South Korea's business-government
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partnership. It also focuses on exchanges between focus countries
and the affluent developed countries on whom the bulk of trade is
currently dependent. But it is not necessary to preclude other
countries from the transaction model proposed in the following
sections
.
In section II an analytic framework is developed based on the
three strategic factors within which the focus countries can
assess their existing position in terms of several key variables.
By sheer necessity, elements of this framework are selectively
chosen based on the existing literature on marketing and
competitive strategy as well as our perceptions formed from
on-hand experiences with export development.
Section III assesses the strategic choices available to the focus
countries based on their available strengths. Two major
dimensions are developed that reflect the basis for strategy
dialogue to confront the challenges of dynamic market forces.
These include PRODUCT-MARKET strategy and TECHNOLOGY- INDUSTRY
strategy which implicitly or explicitly address issues
highlighted in section II.
A limitation of this paper, discussed in the concluding section,
is that it chooses not to address each and every factor having a
bearing on international transactions. Obviously such an
endeavour would be nebulous. However, it is felt that some of the
key determinants have been identified which could provide
strategic guidance to the focus countries in shaping the
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appropriate course of action in their efforts at reducing
dependence
.
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II. THE STRATEGY PYRAMID - AN ANALYTIC FRAMEWORK FOR STRATEGY
FORMULATION
To determine the areas in which the focus countries need to
concentrate strategic strengths, the key elements of the three
strategic factors are highlighted in this section. These three
superordinate factors constitute what will be referred to as the
STRATEGY PYRAMID (FIG.l). At the base lies structural factors in
which fundamental and enduring changes have to be brought about
to help form the basis for adapting and maneuvering strategy
options to confront market forces. Without a sound structural
base, it is contended that competitive strengths will be
attenuated. Thus a sound structural base is expected to provide
the foundation from which attack-defense strategies can be
developed to create and maintain competitive advantage. The
changes that have to be brought about at the competitive level
are relational in that various coalitions and interest groups
have to be dealt with in vying for position. The competitive
advantages are then expected to facilitate market access where
any changes have to revolve around the product-market
combination.
The key questions that the focus countries have to address
revolve around entering (choosing) a market, securing a foothold,
developing and penetrating the market, and maintaining a grip
(i.e. positioning and market share) on the market. To achieve
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this, the task faced by the focus countries is to harmonize their
strengths on all three factors to achieve the best possible fit
between their existing and needed strengths.
Figure-1
The Strategy Pyramid
Needed Changes To Achieve
Product-Market
Market
Access
Factors
Customer Satisfaction
Relational
Competitive
Factors Defensive Positioning
Fundamental
Structural
Factors Flexibility
Adaptability
Resilience
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2 . 1 MARKET ACCESS FACTORS
Although emphasized earlier, it must be reiterated that durable
market shares are gained through customer satisfaction. In this
regard the Japanese and the South Koreans have done some
remarkable things to gain favour.
For example, the Japanese, despite their emphasis upon quality,
also focus on customer satisfaction by stressing after-sales
service. They establish an adequate number of service centres so
that products can be quickly repaired, customer complaints
quickly handled, and good customer relationships fostered (Kotler
and Fahey, 1985). The implications for offering such
satisfactions are hard to quantify but the positive value of
goodwill generated from such actions cannot be disregarded. In a
similar fashion the focus countries must also endeavour to
provide satisfactions, not just products, if they are to gain
ground in their chosen markets. Entering a market is one thing,
achieving market penetration and ultimately attaining dominance
is something else (Kotler and Fahey, 1985).
In sum, the focus countries have to adopt the marketing concept
which stresses that "The key task of a business is to determine
the needs and wants of target markets and to adapt so as to
deliver the desired satisfactions more effectively and
efficiently than its competitors" (Kotler , 1980) . Several critical
aspects that impede the focus countries' access to international
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markets are discussed in the following lines. These need to be
addressed and alleviated if the focus countries are going to
establish long term relationships with their chosen markets.
2.1.1. The Image Gap
It is argued here that concessionary measures will not guarantee
market access unless customers view products from developing
countries favourably. Thus, a key question here is whether
products from developing countries are perceived favourably. It
is important to assess this because from a marketing standpoint,
the more positive the attitude towards a product, the greater the
likelihood that it will be purchased provided it meets customer
needs. In this regard the focus countries seem to lack the brand
name based image used by leading marketers to command customer
allegiance and premium prices. Empirical studies indicate that
the country of origin has a considerable influence on the quality
perceptions held by consumers in various countries. A fairly
comprehensive survey by Bilkey and Ness (1982) corroborates this.
For example, Krishnakumar (1974), Wang (1978), and Hampton (1977)
indicate the existence of a positive relationship between product
evaluations and degree of economic development. Wang (1978) also
indicates the source country's culture and political climate as
significant variables in product evaluations. Gaedeke (1973)
indicates that specific brands might be evaluated higher or lower
when country of origin was revealed as compared with no country
of origin being given.
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While there are several methodological limitations in this area
of enquiry, the implications of these studies are, however,
obvious. If consumer perceptions are negatively biased toward
products from any focus country, the critical priority of the
industry in that country is to develop awareness and confidence
in its chosen segments about its products. The case of Japan
serves as a good example of how they dealt with a similar
problem. It is widely known, for instance, that two or three
decades ago Japanese products conveyed a very poor image. To
overcome this they worked on it deliberately and logically for
almost twenty five years to achieve the penetration of the
Western markets which is contrary to the belief that Japan's
success is a recent and sudden phenomenon of the 1970s ( 1985).
4
To the extent that the focus countries want to succeed, they will
have to invest in gathering knowledge about other markets and
focus on the marketing discipline to turn around the existing
negative perceptions about their products.
2.1.2 Political Barriers to Entry
Conventional wisdom about international trade asserts that free
trade among nations tends to promote specialization and increases
the output of those countries engaged in it. However, the
behaviour of nations suggests that policy makers or politicians
are either ignorant of this assertion or do not believe in it.
Alternatively they may choose to ignore the assertion to pursue
self-serving interests. Whatever the bias, evidence indicates
that they engage in political machinations favouring protection
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(Paden, 1975). The recent spate of statements by politicians at
the highest echelons of the political sphere about how American
jobs have been taken away by the flood of foreign imports is a
case in point which could be a cause for concern for those focus
countries that depend on the US market.
Political considerations have often given way to various forms of
trade barriers which include tariffs, quotas, restrictive
regulations, preferential procurement, tax treatments, labour
policies, and domestic subsidies which are well known devices for
downplaying commercial trade among nations.
Political impediments are most likely to arise in salient
industries that affect some important host country objectives
like employment, regional development, defense, culture, etc. In
these situations it may be necessary to engage in the management
of relations with those national governments which provide good
opportunities for products of the focus countries. In this
regard, the degree of responsiveness to host government concerns
can help alleviate many of the impediments on which they can
exercise considerable influence. The Japanese strategy to invest
in automobile manufacturing facilities in the United States in
response to political outbursts that American jobs were being
lost to the Japanese is a good example of relational
responsiveness
.
Working closely with a certain host country's concerns may
ofcourse have implications for internal political rancour as well
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as how other trading partners will view such trading relations.
This gets into very complex interrelationships which is beyond
the scope of this paper. However, it may suffice to say that
issues may be resolved preferably on long term economic
considerations rather than political ideologies that impede
growth. We do not wish to imply, however, that the focus
countries should not subscribe to any ideology.
2.1.3. Information Gap as a Barrier to Market Access
It has been stressed in this paper that the focus countries
should adopt a marketing orientation to provide customer
satisfaction. This calls for substantial investment in
information on trends, needs, wants, attitudes, and a related set
of factors that would help them adopt the marketing concept.
Unfortunately, this seems to be an area that has been neglected.
Even in the developed economies like the US, the contention is
that most companies have not yet adapted to the intensified
information requirement for effective marketing in a modern
economy (Kotler , 1980)
.
In contrast, it is held that the Japanese have been successful
because they have become attuned to the local requirements and
the wants and needs of different market segments throughout the
world. They monitor them continuously and insightfully and have
successfully developed new products to meet them(Lazer, et.al,
1985)
.
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While the benefits of investing in information would seem to be
enormous not much is known about the information gathering
practices and capacities of the focus countries. By assembling
and analysing data on competitors, the economy, and demographics,
it is possible to spot new niches and develop new products
serving unattended needs. Given the strategic value of
information, it hardly needs stressing that intelligence
gathering activities of the focus countries must be improved.
However, it must be pointed out that customer based information
alone would not be adequate. Efforts must also be devoted to
monitoring competitive and technological developments in specific
product-market domains.
2.1.4 Distribution Effectiveness
A major criticism launched against exporters from developing
countries is their inability to adhere to delivery schedules.
This was pointed out in a seminar in Bangladesh organized by the
International Trade Center. A case in point is the supply of jute
sacks from Bangladesh to US grain exporters. If the sacks don't
reach the exporters on time, they cannot fulfill their commitment
to grain buyers and stand the chance of losing the deal.
Consequently they may be forced to look for alternative suppliers
or alternative means. In the Bangladesh case, delivery problems
resulted in the buyer switching to other suppliers causing the
country to lose a vital customer. It is, therefore, essential
that delivery is assured by the focus countries on a reliable and
consistent basis.
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The particular problem cited above, it must be mentioned,
resulted from internal as well as international transportation
availability problems coupled with storage problems. These issues
must be resolved through subcontracting, leasing, or other
arrangements to remain credible to buyers in overseas markets.
2.1.5 Quality as a Strategic Access Factor
The consumer in many of the target markets is growing
increasingly affluent. With affluence comes an inclination to go
for quality. As Buzzell (1983) claims, 'almost everybody is in
favour of high quality' . As a result, quality has been a
cornerstone of the policies of most market leaders. According to
Ray Crock of McDonald's, quality, service, cleanliness, and value
has been the overruling theme of the organization. Experiences
also indicate that Digital (DEC) pursues quality with quixotic
zeal, Maytag offers ten years' trouble free operation,
Catterpillar zealously pursues the goal of building a better,
more efficient crawler tractor than anybody else in the world,
while an analyst calls P&G's pursuit of quality its "Achilles
Heel" (Peters and Waterman, 1982). Although the list can be
extended endlessly, the message is clear. The pursuit of quality
can help the focus countries reap rich rewards while its
disregard can mean ruination given the existing perceptions held
about their products.
Having identified five critical factors that are expected to
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determine to a significant extent whether markets can be
accessed, competitive factors that can help shape market access
is developed in the next section.
2.2 COMPETITIVE FACTORS
The industrial entrepreneurs and policy makers in focus countries
need to understand the forces affecting international competition
to cope with the complex dynamics of overseas markets. There is
currently little evidence that such an understanding exists. This
is characterised by their aging and fragmented industries,
traditional products, lack of innovation, weak managerial
strengths, and poor bargaining positions.
To attain a sustainable differential advantage in international
markets the focus countries will need to contend with three
forces. These include uncertainty, slowdown in economic growth,
and numerous coalitions or interest groups. An understanding of
these forces can pave the way to creating niches in the
international markets that can be successfully defended.
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2.2.1 Uncertainty in the Global Arena
The growing complexities and the attendant uncertainties in the
socio-economic environment has been clearly demonstrated by many
(Toffler, 1970; Pfeffer and Salancik, 1978) . This is more pervasive
in the context of international trade and commerce. For example:
1. there could be unexpected shortages of critical raw
materials (e.g. OPEC's policies in the seventies).
2. new technological innovations could completely take
away market shares (e.g synthetics replacing largely
the need for wool, jute, rubber, and other natural
products)
.
3. exporting firms and their government may join forces
in directing aggresive marketing policies (e.g. the
cooperation between Japan's MITI and private
sector)
.
4. improvement in technological sophistication of other
countries could intensify the competition from
rivals and new entrants (e.g. the rise to economic
power of Korea, Singapore, Hong Kong, and Taiwan).
5. intervention of host country governments to protect
their national industries could also be highly
disruptive.
Whether future turbulence is linked to these or other causes,
unpredictability is an issue that cannot be avoided, only
minimized. To the extent that uncertainty of operating in global
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markets is high, focus countries must engage in environmental
scanning by improving their intelligence gathering activities.
While environmental scanning may call for resource commitments
beyond what is available, that fact does not diminish the
importance of being informed. Under the circumstances, focus
countries may have to rely on public sources of information or
other less expensive sources, at least initially.
2.2.2 Global Economic Slowdown
There are numerous signs that portend an era of slower economic
growth in the coming decades (Kotler & Singh, 1983). The World
Bank (1983) also contends that economic growth in the developed
countries will be slower in 1985-95, resulting in a slowdown of
world trade which could restrain the growth of developing
countries. Under such circumstances, focus countries would
seem to stand relatively little chance of gaining continued
favours or concessions from the developed world who are
themselves embroiled in gaining strategic market control. Without
concessions, focus countries may have to pursue trade policies
to create new niches or operate at the expense of other countries
through market share gains rather than market growth gains.
This would require a careful appraisal of where the industries of
any focus country are, should be, can be, and must be within a
competitive frame of reference (adapted from Kerin and Peterson,
1983). The ultimate goal is to secure a sustainable differential
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advantage by assessing its strengths and weaknesses and
developing strategies that best suit the exigencies.
2.2.3 Coalitions As Competitive Forces Influencing Market
Exchanges
Porter (1980) provides an excellent frame of reference for
analysing the global competitive environment. According to him,
"the structural factors and market forces operating in the global
industries are the same as those in more domestic industries ....
the same five forces are at work, and the same underlying
structural factors determine their strength".
The five forces suggested by Porter include rivals, threats from
new entrants, threat of substitutes, bargaining power of buyers,
and bargaining power of suppliers. These forces serve as the
structural determinants of the intensity of competition that
focus countries could face in the international arena.
For example, rivalry among existing competitors has resulted in
internecine warfare as demonstrated by OPEC countries time and
again. Similar inner feuds have rocked other coalitions as well
(e.g tin, cocoa, rubber, sugar, etc.). In each case countries
engaged in rivalry have in general been left worse off.
Furthermore, as Gluck (1983) contends, "more and more countries
around the world are developing the capacity to compete
aggressively in world markets. They are willing to learn, adapt,
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and innovate" . Threats from new entrants are obviously real and
could rapidly take away market share from any entrenched quarters
if they become complacent. The threat from substitutes has also
left many wondering about their rapidly dwindling control over
the markets. For example Bangladesh's share in the world
production of jute has fallen from a formidable 80 percent in
1947 to about 29 percent at present due to the forays of
synthetics into the country's established niches.
Bargaining power of buyers can also restrict the ability of
supplying countries to compete effectively. This can be
illustrated by the case of Zambia whose exports of copper account
for 70% of its foreign exchange earnings. Since only a few
countries are major processors of copper into finished products,
Zambia has not be able to bargain effectively. Although Porter
(1980) suggests the importance of choosing the buyer group as a
strategic decision, the luxury of choosing under some
circumstances does not necessarily lie with the suppliers. In a
similar vein, attempts at diversification to gain competitive
advantage may be severely restricted by suppliers when
technological and related resources have to be obtained from
abroad. If the dependence relationship is not satisfactory,
balance may be brought about in several ways. Pfeffer and
Salancik (1978), suggest structural changes, use of buffer
organizations, or changing the purpose of the organization if the
assymetry grows bigger and bigger. These suggestions clearly
hinge on the contingencies of the situation addressing which is
beyond the scope of this paper. It should be obvious at this
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point, however, that understanding the structural determinants of
competition is essential for focus countries if they are to
survive in the viciously competitive international markets.
Having addressed the forces of competition that can shape the
strategic choices available to the focus countries, the last but
possibly the most important factor - structural factor - is
addressed in the next section.
2.3 STRUCTURAL FACTORS
The dynamic environment of international market transactions is
one of high uncertainty and volatility. There are no guarantees
for unstinted success. Japan's slowdown in trade in recent times
(Fortune, March, 1986) is a glowing example of how a powerful
trading nation is also subjected to the forces of uncertainty.
Analysts, however, believe that the slowdown is a temporary
phenomenon which the Japanese will soon overcome because of the
resilience, and flexibility of their underlying economic and
social structure.
We contend that the extent to which a country can weather the
uncertainties of the global environment depends on its
innovativeness, flexibility, and resilience reflected in its
structure. Two critically important structural factors that must
be harmonized in creating a country's ability to adapt to the
changes, or for that matter, to bring about changes, hinge on the
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quality of their human resources and the country's technological
development. Although other factors could also be named, it is
felt here that these two make the critical difference. Their
importance should be evident from the following discussion.
2.3.1. Human Resources as a Strategic Factor
The importance of human resources is evident from the following
lines (Harbison, 1973):
human resources - not capital, nor income, nor material
resources constitute the ultimate basis for wealth of
nations. Capital and natural resources are passive factors
of production; human beings are the active agents who
accumulate capital, exploit natural resources, build
social, economic, and political organizations, and carry
forward national development.
According to Schumacher (1973), development does not start with
goods, it starts with people and their education, organization,
and discipline.
Clearly, developing strategic human resources as the basis for
meeting the challenges of international market forces would be a
key determinant of the outcomes achieved. Unfortunately, as the
World Bank (1980) contends, several factors affect the
effectiveness of human resource development programs in
developing countries. These include:
25-
. lack of political support
. shortage of financial resources, and
. lack of administrative/managerial expertise
To the extent that these problems can be identified, their
alleviation would ultimately determine the capacity of the focus
countries in creating the needed agents of change - strategic
human resources. Development of human resources in the focus
countries is particularly important because in a large number of
cases the industrial worker is generally believed to be a typical
migrant from a rural area who has had no work experience except
perhaps in agriculture before taking a factory job.
In a study by Sharma (1979) it is shown, for example, that the
socio-cultural background of the Indian industrial worker
reflects a rural background with little work experience. However,
the author claims that some adjustment in the industrial scene is
reflected in a larger proportion of the workers (in comparison to
earlier studies) with industrial experience who live in the
cities with their families, and demonstrate a higher level of
literacy than the population at large. This is a healthy sign
which indicates the formation of a class of industrial workers
with specialized job skills that offer many advantages. Such
studies in other focus countries are, however, few and hence the
quality of their human resources is difficult to estimate. It is
highly likely that many of these countries lack a class of
industrial workers as seen in the developed world.
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The implications of this weakness for focus countries for
international trade is obvious. Clearly, these countries are
leagues behind in their industrial competence in comparison to
the developed countries. With a relatively low level of
industrial labour skills, the vast majority of the 34 focus
countries remain locked into occupations demanding skills that
are obsolete and fail to provide the flexibility and adaptability
that is required to satisfy the rapidly changing needs and wants
of the international markets. Unless this structural issue is
confronted head-on, it will remain as a critical weakness in a
country's ability to effectively cater to more refined and
diversified demands abroad as well as its power to thwart
competitive forays into its established territories.
2.3.2 Technology as a Strategic Factor
The level of competence, as well as the ability to bring about
technological change is strongly linked to growth. The explosive
development of technology since 1850 has radically altered the
ability of people to produce more and varied goods and services.
Over the last 100 years or so, it has increased the productivity
(per person) of the industrially advanced countries by as much as
twelve to fifteen times (Patel , 1985 )
.
Developing countries, in terms of technological capability,
remain ill-equipped, bereft of capital goods industry, and with
low technological skills. For the focus countries, the
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acquisition of technology is crucial not only to growth but also
to the capacity to grow . Unfortunately, proposals to share
technology have, in recent times, emerged as a cause for
worldwide concern as new technologies remain jealously guarded by
their owners. Where available, much of the current technology is
licensed. When this occurs, "it forms part of a much larger
transaction covering provision of capital goods and equipment,
often of intermediate products, construction of plant,
management, marketing, and finance. In short, it is part of a
much larger package" (Patel , 1985 )
.
As Patel points out, the transfer of technology concerns many
restrictive practices such as exclusive grant back provisions;
challenges to the validity of patents; exclusive dealing;
restrictions on research, use of personnel, adaptations, export,
publicity, use of alternative sources of technology, and use of
technology after expiration of agreements. Such restrictive
practices, often illegal or inadmissible within developed
nations, have been widely imposed on developing countries. How
then can any developing country acquire this much needed factor
to aid it in its quest for competing in the international
markets?
While some aspects of technology spreads through published
literature, personal exchanges, and imitation and copying, most
of it is transmitted commercially. To the seller, the marginal
cost of selling an already developed technology may be small
while to the buyer its development could be very expensive. In
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this situation, the developing countries find themselves in an
inherently weak negotiating position because of their
overwhelming dependence on technology from the West/North. Under
the circumstances, it is clearly necessary to focus on a
technology acquisition strategy that is feasible. This is
discussed later.
2.3.3 Other Structural Impediments to Growth
It has been indicated that the two previously mentioned factors
represent critical structural impediments to growth. A number of
other factors not discussed in detail also exert an indirect
effect on the development process. These include:
1. A very high proportion of population in agriculture
2
.
Underemployment in agriculture
3. Very low savings
4. High population growth rate
5. Poor credit and marketing facilities
6. Poor transportation and communication facilities
7. Low per capita consumption of energy and
8. A major proportion of expenditures on basic needs.
We contend that these elements be considered as the outcome of
underdevelopment rather than its cause.
Having focussed on the structural components of the strategy
pyramid, it is important to examine the strategic choices that
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are potentially available to the focus countries in more specific
terms. These are examined in the next section. It may, however,
be mentioned that any analysis using the strategy pyramid should
begin with structural factors, and move on up through competitive
factors to market access factors because it is felt that each
higher level depends on its immediately preceding level.
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III. STRATEGIC CHOICES
All too often, strategic choices of focus countries have been on
efficiency, i.e., making something cheaper or less expensive.
What is called for, however, is to focus on strategies to achieve
effectiveness in international market transactions. Effectiveness
refers to what Drucker (in Hofer and Schendell, 1978) has
characterised as doing the right things rather than doing things
right. While both are needed for building market strength, Hofer
and Schendell (1978) point out that organizational survival
depends much more on their effectiveness, i.e., how well they
relate to their environments. This is stated a little differently
by Pfeffer and Salancik (1978) who claim that effectiveness
derives from tha management of demand, particularly the demands
of interest groups (which in essence could be Porter's five
forces) upon which organizations depend for resources and
support.
In broad terms, these countries should not only attempt to
overcome their structural limitations as characterized by their
human resources and technology, they must actively seek to
achieve exchanges by choosing markets to serve and deciding which
competitors to compete with. This must be predicated on their
strengths and capabilities that they can bring to bear on the
exchange process. In other words, focus countries must develop
and match their competences with the opportunities and risks
created by environmental change. To achieve this, they need to be
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both effective and efficient through addressing the key
components of strategy (Hofer and Schendell, 1978) which hinge on
defining the scope of operations, resource deployments,
competitive advantages, and creating synergy. Two major strategy
choice dimensions are suggested here that need to be effectively
coordinated and implemented to create a defensible position
through developing synergy and skillfully deploying resources.
These include product-market strategy and technology-industry
strategy. A third dimension, structural strategy through
developing human resources, is not elaborated in this paper.
3.1 Product market strategy
To achieve success in international market transactions, it is
crucial to select the right product-market combination.
3.1.1 Product Choice : In an era of vigorous competition in
growth industries like computers and electronics, it is obvious
that most focus countries have neither the technological know-how
nor the R&D capability to compete with fast track products. As a
result, in adopting diversification strategies from a commodity
orientation, it would seem best to target low technology products
in the mature stage of the product life cycle. In other words,
instead of concentrating on advanced technological products in
their growth stages, it may be strategically wise to concentrate
on simple basic products that have worldwide demand. Thus,
instead of trying to produce cars, computers, and electronics, it
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may be better to produce nuts and bolts, buttons, doorknobs, and
the multitude of other products that satisfy the basic needs of
daily life and in which focus countries can rapidly acquire the
needed skills and possibly offer the most competitive prices.
3.1.2 Quality : As stressed earlier, quality can be used as a
strategic variable. Reseach based on the PIMS data base indicates
that businesses selling high-quality products and services are
generally more profitable than those with lower-quality offerings
(Buzzell, 1983). Thus quality and reliability must be offered as
a means to cultivating long-run confidence to secure continued
access to the markets.
3.1.3 Product Mix : To remain competitive in the long run,
strategies should be adopted that focus on product improvement
and proliferation, as well as on market development through
segmentation and positioning. It would seem desirable to
concentrate on a few products, gradually progressing from
consumer items to industrial products over time. Such strategies
have been adopted by the Japanese as well as the 'four dragons' -
i.e. Singapore, Taiwan, Hongkong, and South Korea (Kraar, 1981).
This could be further operationalized by market sequencing, i.e.,
gaining a foothold in a limited market first and then spreading
out from this focal point.
3.1.4 Responsiveness to Political Concerns : In designing
suitable strategies it may be necessary to consider the
possibility of facing political barriers when entering certain
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markets. To avoid this, focus countries may have to, at least
initially, be responsive to host government concerns and work
with them to keep out of markets sensitive to political
protection.
3.1.5 Market selection : As mentioned earlier, it may be
necessary to progress from consumer to industrial products. This
may be accomplished by focussing on channels rather than on final
consumers. Initially, the strategy may be to sell production
capacity rather than branded products and use channel members to
gain entry. This is a strategy that many of the Newly
Industrializing Countries (NICs) adopted initially. Some continue
to do so by using brand names of distributors rather than their
own. It is, thus, not uncommon to encounter Slazenger tennis
racquets made in Taiwan or designer clothes made in Singapore
which are sold in developing country markets. Under the
circumstances, the channel members may take major responsibility
for setting standards and marketing finished products.
It may be possible in the longer run to evolve from a marketer of
production capacity to a marketer of branded products (Wortzel <&
Wortzel, 1981). When this happens, the producer can take full
responsibility for both internal and external design for
packaging and quality control.
Experiences from S.Korea's rise to industrial power provides
further insight into the proposed strategy. A World Bank report
(Westphal, Rhee, and Purselll , 1983 ) indicates that even though
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most of Korea's manufactured exports are domestically produced,
some or all of the functions of organizing export activities may
be carried out by overseas firms. Thus, one approach is
international subcontracting in which an overseas firm buys
Korean capacity. In many cases foreign buyers are also a source
of product design. In the major export industries, for example,
nearly all firms sold a sizeable fraction of their exports under
foreign brand names. This could be a very viable entry strategy
for the focus countries. The World Bank report adds that most
Korean exporters spend little on advertising and a minority of
the firms rely on overseas firms to provide after sales service.
Clearly, foreign participation could play a particularly
important role in nurturing and strengthening product promotion
for the focus countries. If this dependence relation is sought,
the terms of the contract have to be settled such that clear
lines of responsibility and accountability are established to
diffuse potential channel conflict.
3.2 Technology - Industry Strategy
Given the product-market choices discussed in the previous
section, it is necessary to consider the technology-industry
strategy that would best suit the needs of the focus countries.
3.2.1 Technology strategy : The key to choosing technology is to
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focus on that technology in which the country has a reasonable
chance of moving sufficiently down its learning curve to be able
to compete internationally (Ferdows and Rosenbloom, 1981).
Furthermore, the advantage in low cost labour must also be
exploited in fields that require some technological
sophistication that can be easily learned.
A key constraint, as explained earlier, is the acquisition of
technology. In this regard two options may be exercised. The
first is to engage in the acquisition of technology on an
increasingly commercial framework. Based on this choice, each
country must know exactly what it wants even if the price is
exacting. It must be ensured that the acquired technology can be
locally assimilated. The extent to which this can be achieved
would have to depend on ensuring the development of mastery by
the use of national counterparts working alongside foreign
consultants and experts and by sending nationals abroad for
better education and training. The importance of developing
local expertise cannot be emphasized enough because with
increased local capacity to undertake subsequent ventures,
domestic sources can gradually replace foreign sources.
The other option may lie in attracting direct foreign investment
which could include a package of entrepreneurial, managerial, and
technical skills; capital; improved technology; and in some cases
access to foreign markets. As UNIDO (UN Industrial Development
Organization) contends, foreign direct investment has been an
important element in the industrialization strategies of many
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developing countries.
In this regard valuable lessons can again be learnt from Korean
experiences in their quest for acquiring technological
competence. According to a World Bank study (Westphal et. al.,
1983), direct foreign investment has been their principal source
of acquiring technological capacity - particularly in chemical
fertilizers, petroleum refining, and electronics. In some
industries, the first plants were built on a turnkey basis and on
a limited scale. Construction of second and subsequent plants
followed quickly with Korean engineers and technicians assuming
an increased role in project design and implementation, and at
scales much closer or equal to world scale.
In some cases, investments by many Japanese firms appear to have
been in the form of second-hand machinery which was transferred
to Korea after it could no longer be profitably used in Japan.
Focus countries could also selectively choose not the latest
technology but ones that could be profitably exploited by making
a worldwide search for such technology.
3.2.2 Industry Strategy : At the industry level some hard
choices have to made. These choices could be strategically based
on the life cycle concept. Three choices are obvious.
The first is to gradually move out of declining industries of
which many are expected to be found in the focus countries given
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their reliance on outdated technology. A Bangladesh case is
readily available in this regard. This relates to jute which was
responsible for 69 percent of the country's foreign exchange
earnings in 1979. World import figures, however, indicate a rapid
decline in its requirements, particularly with the advent of
synthetics. While the situation suggests getting out of jute, it
could have serious repercussions for the economy as this is the
largest agro-industrial sector in the country. Moving out of this
industry would be particularly difficult because of a) exit
barriers that include specialized assets for which other uses
would be hard to find, b) expectation of turmoil caused by the
displaced workers and taken up by political activists and c) the
impact on farmers who represent the large majority of the
population and who cultivate jute as a cash crop as well as the
various subsidiary industries that have been built around jute.
Some emotional barriers could also be expected in the sense that
jute has been the mainstay of the economy probably since 1832
when it was successfully spun into yarn in Dundee.
The alternative is equally, if not more, harsh. Adhering to an
industry that slowly saps the strength of the economy is
certainly not a viable alternative because by neoorthodox and
traditionalist standards the performance of jute has been poor.
Not only has jute been unable to generate sufficient surplus,
rather massive amounts of subsidies had to be infused into- this
sector to keep it going. This has resulted in considerable
resource drain on the economy. Unless some durable niches can be
found for such declining industries they may have to be harvested
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in a controlled way. How that can be achieved is a matter that is
contingent on the particular situation and cannot be specifically
addressed here.
The second choice is to go for those mature industries which are
simple to assimilate and for which cost leadership (Porter , 1980)
can be quickly attained based on the countries' low labour costs.
In fact cost based strategies are important because there seems
to be a shared belief among managers in high performance
organizations that low cost producers are the only sure-fire
winners (Peters and Waterman, 1982).
A third strategy is to increase the concentration ratio of chosen
export oriented industries to create economies of scale. Many of
the focus countries may not have been able to take advantage of
economies of scale because of their fragmented industry
environments. This may have been partly due to lack of access to
markets and partly due to complacency on the part of owners of
the firms to expand their businesses. Because of this, the focus
countries are unable to gain further cost advantages which could
give them greater competitive clout in challenging market forces
such as tariff barriers, substitute products, and technology
based cost reductions in the developed world.
In many countries, attempts have been made to overcome this
through the public sector or through consolidation.
In this regard Japan's experience is illuminating. To overcome
the competitive weaknesses of fragmented industries and to
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realise scale economies, MITI's interventions not only included
controls on technology imports and staggered investment plans,
but also included the arrangement of mergers to increase industry
concentration (Shihonara et. al.1983).
To gain from the advantages of economies of scale, therefore,
focus countries should look to reducing fragmentation. This could
be achieved through vertical or horizontal integration depending
on the existing constraints. When achieved, economies of scale
through concentration can provide a fundamental strategic
advantage through lowered prices which is one of the irresistible
forces in market transactions.
3.3 Structural Strategy
To address structural issues even in a general sense is not easy
and a cursory treatment may not be worthwhile. Since part of
structural features have been addressed in technology-industry
strategy, two issues will only be briefly examined.
On the issue of developing strategic human resources, if the
problems portrayed by the World Bank (mentioned earlier) remain,
efforts must be devoted to rooting out these limitations. If this
can be achieved, we believe that the focus of developing
strategic human resources should be on specialised education
which must be technology centered. Thus, any new funding should
go for the creation of numerous polytechniques that teach
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specific skills. It is these skills that, in the long run, are
expected to provide the flexibility and resilience that any
country should aspire to develop.
The other aspect that must be structurally intertwined with
strategy issues is that of a sound information/market
intelligence system. This issue is addressed here because the
need for information transcends all other factors enabling
strategy formulation. There is a crucial need to develop key
indicators on which information can be provided on a systematic
and regular basis to the decision making centres. Use of UN
agencies and other pubic sources of information are particularly
stressed. On special occasions, market studies could be
commissioned to focus on need based information.
A cursory treatment on these two issues are necessitated by the
fact that the exigencies will determine what specific strategies
can be followed by any particular country at a given time.
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IV. CONCLUSIONS
While this paper attempts to capture key variables in a framework
for strategic analysis to enable focus countries to shift from a
position of dependence to some form of interdependence, we have
made a number of static assumptions. For instance, what are the
implications for strategic shifts adopted by any focus country?
Would a shift in strategy even survive if this engenders
hostilities by attacking vested interests? The effects of
possible retaliatory measures that could be adopted by other
countries certainly demands attention from a dynamic/evolutionary
perspective
.
The paper also assumes that any strategic alternative devised by
a focus country can be effectively implemented. This assumption
is not realistic because there is a difference between knowing
what to do and knowing how to do it. Although the second concern
is not addressed here it is important to draw the distinction and
refer to the important link between the two. In this regard the
success of the Japanese is attributed to a large measure on their
implementation capabilities (Shihonara et. al., 1983). A similar
belief is also held about Koreans; e.g., Jones and Sakong (1980)
state that Koreans are better at implementation than at planning.
For focus countries, their ability to implement plans will
determine how successfully they can operationalise their
strategies
.
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Issues such as organizational climate, managerial incentives, the
work ethic, and other related factors which could influence
strategy formulation and implementation are further areas of
concern not addressed here. Although these issues merit
recognition, they remain beyond the scope of this paper.
Based on strategic management, marketing, and economics
literature, this paper attempts to engender strategic thinking at
the national policy level. To the extent that its adoption helps
tackle specific questions on various alternatives available to
the focus countries will determine the viability of the strategy
pyramid concept.
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